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                                Abstract 
    I analyze 377 takeovers that occurred in Japan between 2000 and 2007. My focus is 
on the choice of payment method between cash and shares, the bidding premium, the 
market valuation of a bidder and a target, and the share price reaction. I relate the 
findings to the two complimentary theories of takeover motives; the Q-theory and the 
misvaluation theory. Japanese takeover market was very small before the late 1990s and 
then quickly expanded in the 21st century, so that I believe that we are among the first to 
explore the marker. 
    My results are in contrast with Dong et al. (2006) and most of the findings are 
rather consistent with the Q-theory than with the misvaluation theory. Although I
understand the difficulty of separating the Q -theory and the misvaluation theory, as 
Dong et al, explain, the Japanese evidence casts doubt over the global applicability ofthe 
theory of a misvaluation-driven merger wave.
    Keywords: Tender Offer Bid, Mergers, Stock-to-stock acquisitions, Q theory, 
Misvaluation Hypothesis
1. Introduction 
    Following years of relative inactivity, the twenty-first century has seen the market for 
corporate control emerging and developing quickly in Japan. According to Recof 
Corporation's MARR Magazine (2008), the number of purely domestic mergers and
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acquisitions increased from 453 in 1997 to 2,020 in 2007, and permeated all levels of 
corporate Japan. 'Ihe government helped the development of the market for corporate 
control by a series of deregulation. The motivation was to promote the consolidation 
among Japanese companies and help the economy to recover from the prolonged 
recession. One of the most prominent reforms was that of the Commercial Law in 1999. 
Following the reform, Japanese M&A transactions, which used to be conducted either by 
a merger (using shares as a means of payment) or by a cash acquisition of shares (partly 
through a tender offer bid), have come to include kabusbikl-kokan (stock-to-stock 
acquisition) that enables an acquirer to transform atarget company into a 100-percent-
owned subsidiary of the acquirer by forcefully exchanging the target's shares with the 
acquirer's. 
    With the market for corporate control quickly expanding in Japan over the decade, 
and with more choices available regarding payment methods, I am curious how the 
management of Japanese corporation chooses among the alternatives. I am particularly 
interested in relating the choice to the motivations for an M&A transaction of the 
management. As Doug, Hirshlelfer, Richardson, and Tech (2006) claim, there are 
broadly two alternative theories of takeovers, one based upon stock market misvaluation 
and the other based upon the Q theory of investment (Brainard and Tobin (1968)). Dong 
et al. claim that the US evidence is broadly consistent with both hypotheses. 
    Based upon Dong et al's results, I investigate a similarity or a difference b tween the 
motivation in the US and in Japan. Since the previous research such as Kang, 
Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000) and Inoue and Kato (2006) find that the share price 
reaction of an acquirer to a takeover announcement is significantly positive, I expect that 
the acquirer's management generally works to increase the wealth of its shareholders. I 
still do not know, however, whether the management is also motivated by market 
misvaluations to launch a takeover, particularly when the management can use overvalued 
shares as an acquisition currency. Following Dong et al. (2006), I investigate the 
characteristics of an acquirer and of a target, and the selected payment method. I also 
examine whether the choice is related to the level of control premium paid to target 
shareholders and the share price reaction to the news of the deal. 
    My results are in contrast with Dong et al. (2006) and most of the findings are 
inconsistent with the misvaluation theory. Although I understand the difficulty of 
separating the Q-theory and the misvaluation theory, as Dong et al. explain, the Japanese 
evidence casts doubt over the global applicability of the theory of a misvaluation-driven 
merger wave. 
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    The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I briefly summarize the two 
complementary theories of takeovers developed by previous research. I also explain the 
measures that I use to test the two theories. In Section 3, I explain my data, hypotheses 
and testing methodology. In Section 4, I present the empirical results both from 
univariate and multivariate tests, which I summarize and conclude in Section 5.
2. Previous Research Literature 
2.1. The Q theory: Under the Market Efficiency 
    The Q theory of an M&A (Brainard and Tobin (1968)) focuses on the 
redeployment of target assets. High market valuation means that a company is well 
managed or has good investment opportunities. A takeover ofa low valuation target by a 
high valuation acquirer implies good news that a well-managed company acquires a
poorly-managed target o increase the more efficient deployment of the latter's assets 
(Jensen and Ruback (1983)), Thus, the bidder and target valuations affect he returns of 
share prices at the time of the takeover announcement. Under the Q hypothesis, the 
offers by well-run (high-Q) bidders generate greater total gains from takeover on average, 
and therefore yield higher bidder stock returns. 
    There are several empirical findings that are related to the Q theory. For example, 
Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) show that a high-Q acquirer meets with more positive 
share price reaction at a takeover announcement than a low-Q acquirer. They also find 
that a low-Q target receives larger takeover premium than a high-Q target. They report 
that a takeover by a high-Q acquirer of a low-Q target results in the largest gain in market 
value of combined market value of shares of the acquirer and the target, which implies 
that the market expects the improvement of the target's management most under such 
takeover. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) report hat in two-thirds of their 
sample takeovers, the Q-ratio of a bidder is higher than that of a target. Hansbrouck 
(1985) finds that within an industry, a firm with low Q-ratio is more likely to become a 
target of a takeover, which he interprets as evidence that a company that is poorly 
managed is targeted in a takeover bid.
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2.2. The Misvaluation Theory: Under the Market Inefficiency 
    While the Q-theory fits in the framework of the market efficiency, the misvaluation 
theory of a takeover assumes the market inefficiency. The theory suggests hat a bidder 
tries to profit by buying an undervalued target for cash at a price under fundamental 
value, or by paying by shares when the bidder's share is overvalued. Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) argue that target overvaluation e courges the target management to voluntarily 
accept expropriative offers in order to cash out. Misvaluation of a bidder and a target 
affects the means of payment (stock versus cash), bid premium, and announcement-
period returns. According to the misvaluation theory, a takeover by a high valuation 
acquirer, particularly using shares as a means of payment, should result in the negative 
market reaction because the market regards that the acquirer's shares are overvalued rather 
than the target's shares are undervalued. This should occur under the condition that the 
degree ofmisevaluation f a bidder is larger than that of a firm being acquired. Under the 
Q-theory, offers by well-run (high-Q) bidders generate greater total gains from a takeover 
on average, and therefore yield higher bidder stock returns.
2.3. Valuation Measures for Empirical Tests of the Two Theories 
    The above two theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, unless one is a pure 
market efficiency believer. However, as I have described, there are circumstances where 
the two theories make the opposite prediction, such as the market's reaction to a takeover 
by a high valuation bidder using shares as a means of payment. Therefore, I am interested 
in figuring out which of the two theories explains better what I observe in the market, 
    In order to separate out the effects from the two theories, Dong et al. (2006) 
propose the use of two valuation ratios. One is the price-to-book ratio (hereafter P/B) 
and the other is the price-to-theoretical-value r tio (hereafter P/V).' They claim that the 
Q theory is related to the P/B ratio and the misvaluation theory is related to the P/B and 
the PN ratios. Since P/V ratio reflects the analysts' forecasts offuture earnings, P/V is a 
relatively pure measure ofmisevaluation a d it has also been used by other research such 
as Frankel and Lee (1998), Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) and D'Mello and Shroff 
(2000). Dong et al. (2006) admit the limitation of P/V ratio because analysts forecasts 
may not perfectly reflect information about the future growth of the company. They 
propose the inclusion of bidder and target P/B in their tests of the effects of bidder and 
target P/V and claim that P/B and P/V provide complementary information about he
' The theoretical value (V) is derived from the model of Ohlson (1995).
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misvaluation hypothesis.
3. Data and Methodology 
    The focus of my research is to follow Dong et al. (2006) and examine whether I can 
observe similar effects in Japan to what they find in the US takeover market. As I 
described, Japanese takeover market has only got active since the late 1990s, so relatively 
few research has been made as to reactions and consequences of atakeover inthe country. 
Furthermore, the previous research reports ignificantly positive share price reaction of a 
bidder, so that I expect the management of a bidder to generally act more oriented to the 
value creation of its shareholders. Therefore, simply replicating Dong et al. (2006) with 
Japanese data may result in different findings, and may provide more insights as to the 
generality of their findings in a more global setting.
3.1. Data 
    I have collected the sample of tender offers (TOBs), stock-to-stock acquisitions 
(kabushiki-kokan), and mergers (gappei) between 1999 and 2007 from Nikkei AMSUS/ 
NEEDS Database. Accounting data and share price data are also collected from them. 
Shareholding data are manually collected from Nikkei Kaisha-Joho (Company Data 
Book). The earnings forecast data, which I use to calculate theoretical value of shares (V) 
by the model of Ohlson, Juettner-Nauroth (2005), are the figures reported by Toyo Keizai 
Inc., also collected from Nikkei AMSUS/NEEDS Database, The theorectical value is 
calculated based upon the model of Abnormal Earnings Growth model. Abnormal 
Earnings Growth model doesn't need the book value of equity at the date of 
announcement, which makes easier to calculate theoretical value of shares(V), Toyo Keizai 
Inc. is a publisher of economic magazines and compiles its forecast by combining alisted 
company's official earnings forecast and a hearing conducted by reporters of its 
magazines. The earnings forecast data by Toyo Keizai are frequently used in an academic 
research. 
    The sample period is chosen to include kabusbiki-kokan (stock-to-stock 
acquisitions), which were made possible as a result of the reform of the Commercial Law 
in 1999. I have initially collected tender offers, stock-to-stock acquisitions and mergers of 
companies li ted on the First and the Second Sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE 
hereafter) between 2000 and 2007. 1 exclude tender offers whose targeted percentage of 
share purchase isnon-controlling block of below 50 percent. I believe such exclusion is
necessary to enable the comparison of tender offers with stock-to-stock acquisitions and
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mergers, which deal with 100 percent of target company's existing shares. 
    In calculating the valuation ratios, I find that the V is occasionally estimated to be 
very low, causing the P/V ratio to be extremely large. As a result, I use the reciprocal of
P/B and P/V, i.e., B/P and V/P respectively.' I exclude 71 cases where ither B/P or V/P 
is negative, and I sample where V/P is calculated tobe extremely large at above 100. My 
final sample includes 135 tender offers, 166 stock-to-stock acquisitions, and 76 mergers, 
which totals 377 transactions. Within my sample period, all tender offers use cash as a 
sole method of payment, while all stock-to-stock acquisitions and mergers use bidder's 
shares as a means of payment. Therefore, I have 135 cash takeovers and 242 share 
takeovers in my sample. 
3.2. Predictions of the Two Takeover Theories 
    The purpose of my research is to examine how the two theories that I described in
Subsection 2.3 explain the motives of Japanese takeovers, For that purpose, I follow 
Dong et al. (2006) and use B/P and V/P ratios to measure the valuation effect. As they 
admit, it is not necessarily easy to separate the effects of the two theories. Both theories 
may or may not lead to the same empirical predictions. Therefore, I summarize the 
predictions that are considered toresult from each theory as below. 
    Under the Q-theory, when a low B/P (high valuation) bidder acquires a high B/P 
(low valuation) target, greater total (bidder and target combined) gains are generated by
the acquisition than when a high B/P bidder acquires a low B/P target. 'therefore the 
bidding premium may be higher for the former type of acquisitions, since larger gains 
from a takeover imply that a bidder can be more generous insharing the gains with the 
target. As for V/$ the theory does not have any predictions about the gains from a 
takeover. In fact, under the assumption ofmarket efficiency, the difference inV/P should 
be of random nature and should not be associated with takeover gains. Neither does the 
theory predict hat the choice of payment be related to B/P or V/P, because the market 
efficiency implies that a share takeover should offer neither advantage or disadvantage 
over a cash takeover.
2 Since Japanese Securities Law mandates bidders who seek more than 33.4% of 
outstanding shares of targets to use TOB, large number of partial bids for less than 50% 
of outstanding shares of targets are included in the initially collected sample. 
' Dong et al. (2006) report hat the use of B/P and V/P instead of P/B and P/V does not 
affect their results much. 
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    Under the misvaluation theory, both B/P and V/P measure the degree of equity 
misvaluation. When a bidder's B/P and V/P are low (high), meaning overvaluation 
(undervaluation), the bidder is tempted to use its shares (cash) as a means of payment. 
When a target's B/P and V/P are low, meaning overvaluation, a bidder is tempted to use 
its (also vervalued) shares as a means of payment, because this will avoid cashing in the 
target's highly priced shares. In an opposite case, a bidder prefers to use cash to benefit 
from the low target share prices. When a bidder's B/P and V/P are low, and when a 
target's B/P and V/P are high, I expect he bidding premium to be larger because the 
bidder with easier financing can he more generous about paying premium to the 
undervalued target. The choice of shares as a means of payment causes the bidder's share 
price to decrease more than when cash is chosen, since market receives signal that it is 
probable that the bidder's hare price is overvalued. 
4. Results 
4. 1 Descriptive Statistics 
    In Table 1, I report he descriptive statistics ofmy sample, namely the mean and the 
median of the bidding premium,4 the toehold shareholdings (shareholding of a bidder 
prior to a takeover announcement), and B/P and V/Ps of bidders and targets. I also 
report he ratio of target's market cap to bidder's marker cap, which I will use later as 
variables to characterize the takeovers. 
    As I see from Table 1, the bidding premium in Japan is significantly positive. I see, 
however, that the bidding premium is generally smaller in Japan at about 10 percent for 
tender offers and around 5 percent for share takeovers than that in the US. The toehold 
is highest with stock-to-stock acquisitions, then that of tender offers follows. In the case 
of mergers, the toehold is very low with the median being zero. This reflects the fact that
' The bidding premium is calculated as (offer price - target's share price 5 business days 
prior to the offer) / (target's share price 5 business days prior to the offer) for tender 
offers. For mergers and stock-to-stock acquisitions, we calculate the ratio between the 
bidder's hare and the target's share from share prices at 5 business days prior to the 
transaction announcement. The bidding premium is calculated as (announced xchange 
ratio - exchange ratio calculated by market prices at 5 business days prior to the offer) /
(exchange ratio calculate by market prices at 5 business days prior to the offer). 
s B/P and VIP are calculated using the market capitalization at 21 business days prior to 
the announcement. 
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stock-to-stock acquisitions are often used when a target is a partially owned subsidiary of
a bidder, and is transformed to be 100 percent owned subsidiary via a stock-to-stock 
acquisition. In contrast, a merger is frequently used to consolidate independent 
companies which are competing inthe same industry. 
    As for B/F, the median of bidder's B/P is 0.62, while that of a target is about 1, 
which means that the bidders are more highly valued, or better managed, than the targets. 
In contrast, he V/P of a bidder and a target do not differ much, with the mean almost 
equal to 1. This suggests hat on average I do not see systematic misvaluation ofbidders 
or targets, and the bidders are better managed than the targets. 
    Table 2 shows the number of tender offers, stock-to-stock acquisitions and mergers 
by year. It also shows the average B/P of bidders and targets within each subgroup. As I 
can see, the number of tender offers and stock-to-stock acquisitions have been increasing 
since 2000, while that of mergers i decreasing. Thus, takeovers are becoming more 
frequent than mergers within this period. I also note that the average B/P of bidders is 
consistently lower than that of the targets, and shows decreasing trend since 2002. The 
average B/P of targets, which was above I until 2003, has also been decreasing with the 
exception of that of mergers. These unique features ofmergers implies that I might need 
to consider not only the difference between cash deals and share deals, but also the 
difference between merger and stock-to-stock acquisitions. 
4. 2 Univariate Analyses 
4.2. 1 B/P and VIP of Bidders and Targets 
    Next, I examine B/P and V/P of bidders and targets, and test whether there is 
difference between them. Table 3 shows the mean and the median of B/P as well as the 
difference between B/P of bidders and targets. 
   As Table 3 shows, B/P of bidders is significantly lower than that of targets in all 
types of takeovers, which implies that bidders are valued higher than targets. I should 
note, however, that in the case of M&As using shares as a means of payment, B/P of 
targets are higher (at above 1 on average) than that of tender offers, meaning that targets 
are valued relatively lower with share takeovers than with cash takeovers. This is not 
consistent with the prediction of the misvaluation theory that a bidder is tempted to cash 
in when a target is undervalued. As I have described in Section 3, above described results 
are collectively rather consistent with the Q -theory than with the misvaluation theory. 
   As for V/P, Table 3 shows that there is no significant difference between V/P of 
bidders and targets. The exception isthe test of median, but not of the mean, within 
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share takeover sample, where V/P of bidders is lower than that of targets. Since the test of 
the difference of median is not consistent with that of mean in this case, the result is 
weak. Tests of whether the mean of V/P is different from unity are insignificant with 
bidders and targets in all types of M&A, suggesting that I cannot observe the significant 
misvaluation f bidders or targets in any subset of the sample of takeovers. 
4. 2. 2 Abnormal Return of Bidders and Targets around Takeover Announcement 
    I further analyze the market reaction to an announcement of takeovers by 
employing astandard event study methodology. I define the abnormal return as the 
difference between tile return of an individual company and that of the market index 
(TOPIX), using the daily returns. ' The event date is the announcement date of an offer 
in the case of a tender offer, and an announcement dare of the exchange ratio in the case 
of share takeovers. I focus on the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARS) between 
day-1 and day +1 in the following analyses. As I described in Section 1, Kang, 
Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000) and Inoue and Kato (2006) report he positive CARS 
around announcement date of mergers. I am the first to analyze the CARs of stock-to-
stock acquisitions and tender offers, which barely occurred before 1999. 
    Table 4 summarizes the CARs of bidders and targets according to the types of 
M&A. Taking the whole sample, I see that the CARs of bidders in general are not 
negative, which is consistent with the findings of previous researches. 
    The more detailed analysis reveals new findings, particularly about the different 
share price reaction depending on the type of takeovers. The bidder CARs of share 
takeovers are generally higher than that of cash tender offers. 'Ibis is opposite to what the 
previous research in the US, such as Franks, Harris and Titman (1992), reports. In fact, 
the misvaluation theory suggests hat a takeover using shares hould lead to the negative 
share price reaction of bidders. Therefore, my result casts doubt about he validity of 
misvaluation theory in Japan'. 
   As for the target CARS, they are all significantly positive in all types of M&A, but 
are largest at around 12 percent for cash tender offers. The target CARs for mergers are
6 We have checked with the mark
et model using TOPIX, but the results do not 
much because my event window is narrow. 
' We report in the multi
variate analysis of Section 4.3 that the difference of bidder's 
becomes insignificant after controlling for other factors. My claim that there is 
doubt about the validity of misvaluation theory in Japan is still valid. 
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smallest at about 4 percent. Combining the results of bidder and target CARS, I infer 
that the wealth transfer from a bidder to a target is largest in the case of cash tender offers, 
while smallest for mergers. On interpretation of these results is that targets of tender 
offers with relatively low B/P ratio have stronger negotiation power than targets of share 
deals with relatively high B/P ratio. My results suggest that the combined wealth increase 
of a bidder and a target front a takeover is significantly positive in all types of takeovers, 
but how a bidder and a target divide the gain from a takeover is different among the type 
of takeovers.
4. 2. 3 Comparison among Different Types of M&A 
    I have examined the difference between B/P, V/P and CARs depending on the type 
of M&A. I combine the above findings in Table 5 to examine whether there is any 
relationship between the above three measures. 
    Panel A of Table 5 shows the difference between cash tender offers and takeovers 
using shares as a means of payment (including stock-to-stock acquisitions and mergers). 
As I can see, B/P of both bidders and targets of tender offers is significantly lower than 
that of share takeovers. This implies that a tender offer occurs between a highly valued 
bidder and a highly valued target, while a share takeover takes place between a lower 
valuation bidder and a lower valuation target. In the case of target companies, V/P is also 
significantly lower with tender offers, which implies the over valuation of target firms. As 
for CARS, the bidder CARS of cash tender offers are significantly smaller (by 1.5 percent) 
than those of share takeovers, while the target CARs of tender offers are significantly 
larger (by 6.2 percent) than those of share takeovers. My results imply that in tender 
offers, a larger proportion of gains from a takeover are transferred from a bidder to a 
target han in share takeovers, although low B/P of bidders uggests hat they are well 
managed and have high potential for future growth. 'Ibis may be related to the fact that 
target B/P is also low. Since the target is also a company with high potential growth or 
good management, the target's management may be in a stronger position in the 
negotiation of a condition for a tender offer. It may also imply that a bidder is 
overpaying for a target (Roll (1986)). 
    Panel B of Table 5 reports the difference between mergers and stock-to-stock 
acquisitions. I see that B/P of bidders of mergers i significantly higher than that of 
stock-to-stock acquisitions. B/P of merger bidders is the highest among the three types of 
M&A, which implies that a merger is conducted by relatively ow valuation bidder. 'Ibis 
implies that, in Japan, merger isa deal mode which is more frequently used by companies
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facing with low growth opportunities in the same industries to survive the competition, 
since the merging companies can enjoy the equality of the two. 
    There is no significant difference between target's B/P of mergers and stock-to-stock 
acquisitions. As for CARs, the bidder CARs of mergers are significantly larger (by 2.2 
percent) han those of stock-to-stock acquisitions. While the target CARs of mergers are 
smaller (by an offsetting 2.9 percent), the figure is only weakly significant. I can infer 
that the wealth transfer f om a bidder to a target is smaller with mergers than with stock-
to-stock acquisitions. This is consistent with the emphasis of equality of the merging 
firms in Japan.
4. 3 Multivariate Analyses 
    The above univariate analyses have already provided implications about the 
characteristics of bidders and targets according to the type of takeovers. In this 
subsection, I will conduct multivariate analyses and investigate how the management 
chooses between different types of takeovers, and how the market reacts to a takeover 
announcement.
4. 3. 1 Logit Analysis of Choice of Means of Payment 
    From the previous analysis, it has been suggested that the Japanese takeovers are 
more in line with the Q-Theory than with the misvaluation theory. Here, I employ 
multivariate analyses to examine the choice among different types of M&A. I include 
possible xplanatory such as the relative size (market capitalization) of a target to a bidder, 
and a toehold, or percentage of target shares owned by a bidder before an announcement. 
I employ logit analyses for the choice of payment method, i.e, shares or cash, and the 
choice of stock-to-stock acquisitions and mergers within the sub-sample of share 
takeovers. The results are reported in Panels A and B of Table 6, respectively. 
    From Panel A of Table 6, I find that the share takeovers are more likely to be chosen 
when (1) target's B/P is higher, (2) the target's market cap is larger elative to that of an 
acquirer, (3) toehold is larger, and (4) bidder's B/P is higher. The last result is only 
significant when target's B/P is excluded from a regression (one in the last column), so 
that it may simply reflect he first finding. As I found in univariate analyses, it is 
confirmed that a takeover using shares are likely to occur when a target and a bidder are 
poorly valued, while cash offers are more likely when they are highly valued on B/P basis. 
I also know that when a target is relatively large compared with a bidder, share takeovers 
are more likely. This is understandable cause using bidder's own shares as a means of
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payment is particularly valuable when a size of the takeover is large. As for the toehold, I
see that if a bidder already owns larger percentage of shares of a target, share takeover is 
more likely to occur. This is mainly caused by stock-to-stock acquisitions whose objective 
is mainly to transform a partially owned subsidiary to a fully owned one. 
   From Panel B of Tanle 6, I find that neither B/P nor V/P of a bidder or a target 
affects the choice between a merger and a stock-to-stock acquisition, suggesting that the 
valuation is not an issue with the choice. Within the sub-sample of share takeovers, a
merger tends to occur when a target is larger relatively to a bidder, and a stock-to-stock 
acquisition is more likely to be chosen when a bidder already owns large stakes in a 
bidder. 
    I underscore the finding from my logic analysis that the cash offers are more likely to 
be used when a bidder and a target are highly valued. This means that a tender offer is 
chosen by a company that has high valuation and good investment opportunities. 
Together with the fact that V/P is insignificant in all regressions, my finding confirms the 
followings, I do not see an evidence that the Japanese management is motivated by the 
misvaluation to choose shares as a method of payment of a takeover. It is possible, 
however, that not only a bidder's but also a target's higher valuation may imply that the 
target's management prefers to receive cash because their shares are overvalued. I will 
analyze the market reaction to a takeover announcement (the CARS) and whether the 
market reacts negatively suspecting such possibility.
4. 3.2 Analysis of Premium and CARS 
    Table 7 reports the results of two-stage l ast squares (TSLS) regressions, where 
dependent variables are the bidding premium, the bidder's CARs and the target's CARs. 
Since I use a share takeover dummy as an explanatory variable, which I have already 
shown to be correlated with other explanatory variables, uch as a bidder's B/P and a 
target's B/P, I employ the TSLS to cope with the endogeneiry. 
    From the first column of Table 7, I see that the bidding premium becomes (1) 
smaller when the bidder's B/P is higher, (2) larger when the target's B/P is higher, (3) 
smaller when the target's market cap is larger elative to that of an acquirer, and (4) 
smaller when the toehold is larger. The findings imply that the bidding premium is 
largest when the bidder's valuation is high and the target's valuation islow. The fact that 
the highly valued bidder pays larger premium to the poorly valued target is consistent 
with the Q -theory (because the bidder's management is relatively good and the room for 
the improvement of the target is larger), and the misvaluation theory.(because the
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overvalued acquirer is generous about paying premium to the poorly valued target) 
Therefore, how the bidder's hare price reacts to an announcement of a takeover must be 
examined to judge which of the two theories aree more applicable. 
    The third and the fourth findings are intuitively understandable. When a target is 
large relative to a bidder, the bidding premium is expected to be smaller in percentage 
terms (which is how the dependent variable iscalculated) even if the actual amount that is 
paid as the premium may he large. As for the toehold, the result implies that if a bidder 
already owns target's shares, you tend to be in a better position to negotiate with the 
target o accept lower premium. Interestingly, a share takeover dummy does not have an 
impact on the size of the bidding premium. After controlling for factors affecting the 
choice of a means of payment, I see no significant difference of bidding premium 
between cash tender offers and share takeovers. 
    The second and the third columns of Table 7 provide an analysis of bidder's and 
target's hare price reaction (CARs), respectively. I find that bidder's CARs are only 
affected by the ratio of market cap of a target o a bidder. When the ratio is high, or 
when a target is relatively arge compared with an acquirer, bidder's CAR tend to be more 
positive. None of other variables explain bidder's CARs including the share takeover 
dummy. This is not consistent with the misvaluation theory because the market does not 
react negatively to the fact that the management chooses share takeover instead of cash 
tender offer. 'Ihe fact chat he ratio of market cap of a target to a bidder is significant may 
be consistent with the Q -theory because the market interprets he ratio as the signal of 
how confident the target is about its skills or investment opportunities, and is willing to 
take more risk to acquire alarger target. 
    As for target's CARs, they are larger when bidder's valuation is high (B/P is low), 
and targets valuation is low (B/P is high). This is exactly what the Q-theory predicts. 
The wealth improvement of target's shareholders is largest when a bidder is well-managed 
and highly valued, and a target is poorly valued. I should be careful, however, that the 
result could be affected by the result from the first column regression that the higher 
bidding premium tends to be paid to a low-valuation target. 
    The regression of target's CARs also shows that a share takeover causes more 
negative reaction to target's share price. This is despite the fact from the first column 
regression that the choice of a share takeover is not related to the level of the bidding 
premium. Although bidder's hare price does not react negatively to a share takeover, 
target's hareholders may be nonetheless concerned that bidder's shares might be 
overpriced, just as target's shares are overpriced, so that they prefer to receive cash. Such
Ill
asymmetry of perception between shareholders of a bidder and a target is an interesting 
finding that needs further investigation in the future. 
5. Summary of Results and Conclusion 
    My analyses have found that in Japan, cash offers tend to occur when an acquirer 
and a target are highly valued on B/P basis, and when target's size in terms of market cap 
is larger elative to bidder's ize. The bidding premium tends to be higher when a bidder's 
valuation is higher, when a target's valuation is lower, and when target's market cap is 
smaller relative to bidder's market cap. The choice of payment method (cash or stock) 
does not affect he bidding premium. Buyer's CARs are higher when target's market cap 
is larger elative to bidder's market cap. Target's CARs are higher when a bidder's 
valuation ishigher, when a target's valuation is lower, and when cash is used to pay for a 
takeover. 
    My results are generally consistent with the prediction of Q -theory in the sense that 
a highly valued bidder (with good management ability or good investment opportunities) 
tends to pay higher premium using cash as a currency. The favorable r action of target's 
shares to a takeover of a low-valuation target by a high-valuation acquirer is also 
consistent with the Q-theory. On the contrary, I hardly see evidence supporting the 
misvaluation theory. V/P is insignificant in all analyses, suggesting that misvaluation is 
not an issue in Japan. Besides, the higher valuation of a bidder does not increase the 
probability ofa share takeover, which is also inconsistent with the misvaluation theory. 
    I suspect that the Japanese management has so far conducted a takeover based on 
managerial and strategic objectives. The overvaluation f company's shares does not seem 
to be a reason for launching a takeover, nor does the overvaluation affects the choice of 
payment method. My results are also consistent with the finding of Kang et al. (2000) 
and others who report hat that on average a takeover announcement i  Japan results 
positive share price reaction of both a bidder and a target. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the mean (first row) and the median (second row) of the bidding premium, the toehold, FIF 
and VIP of bidders and targets, as well as the ratio f target's market cap to bidder's market cap and the cash 
holdings net of cash of bidders and targets. ", and ' show the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.
Types of M&A N
Bidding
Prermnm
Toehold
Bidder's
B/P
Bidders
VIP
Target's
A/P
Targets
VIP
Targets
hike Cap. /
Bidde?r
Bidders
Cash Nor
Targt&'s
Cast Net
hike can.
of Debt of Dent
Tender Offers 191. 0.00.11 0 111 0.629 It 940 0.970 0934 0.144 11.145 0.094
0.100- U91 0551 0791 0x56 0746 0062 -0.153 -0.092
Share Takeovers 949 00521** 0364 a 820 tIIn 1 131 1.197 0259 -0.I Re -0963
0.0661-1 0404 0689 0711 1094 0848 0 ton -0IRO -0.158
Stock-reSlock 166 /1050 0469 0965 1.199 1294 1 1163 0.118 11.216 -0.149
Acgrsilions 0076-1 0505 11618 0731 1 012 0.769 0054 -0204 -0.152
Mergers 76 0056+ 0.148 0939 0911 1411 1 459 0.565 L 090 1/208
0n44eC 000 /1A 16 0711 1316 11156 0198 -0.091 -0.197
Total 377 0 Mir*0 o s25 0951 1 047 1.202 1 061 /1218 11367 A140
0791- 0.344 6621 6 734 0997 11 R0n 0 081 0.170 -0.136
Table 2: Number of Takeovers by Type and Year 
This table shows the number of takeovers classified by type of transaction 
average B/P of bidders and targets in each subgroup, 
                SubwtalTender Offers Sock--to-Stock A quisitions 
                  Percent Bidder Target Percent Bidder Target 
Year I N N .,,,Total B/P B/P N over Total B/P B/P
ercent idder arget
ear over Tot /P /P
20(30 24 1 125% 6620 096
2001 14 5 35.7% Il 6117 0921
2(102 38 9 247% 1.278 1369
2003 is 7 184% 1055 2.384
2004 58 19 32.8% 0.551 0963
2005 62 21 37.1% 0.445 0736
2006 64 26 40.6% 0.524 0957
2(107 79 41 54.4% 0622 0.874
Total 377 135 158%: 0.629 0970
6 
3 
17 
28 
27 
25 
29 
31 
166
25.0% 
21.4% 
44.7% 
73,7% 
46.6% 
40.3% 
45.3% 
39.2% 
44.0%
0.662 2.134 
1.361 1.811 
1.252 2,818 
0.876 1.509 
0.734 1,096 
0.587 0.906 
Ob07 0,935 
0.679 0.821 
0.765 1 294
and by year. It also reports the
        Mergers 
    Percent Bidder Target 
N over Pouf B/P B/P
15 
6 
12 
3 
12 
14 
9 
5 
76
62.5% 
429% 
316% 
7.9% 
20.7% 
22.6% 
14.1% 
6.3% 
20.2%
1.034 
1.257 
1,295 
0.937 
1.019 
0.716 
0.422 
0.790 
0.939
1.832 
1.668 
1.430 
1.901 
1.052 
1.368 
1,043 
1.467 
432
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Table 3: B/P and VIP Ratios of Bidders and Targets 
This table shows the mean (first row) and the median (second row) of B/P and V/P of bidders and targets 
depending on the type of M&A. and " show the significance of difference at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.
Tapes of M&A N Bidders B/P Targeh B/P
Bidder§ B/P
-Tareet§ B/P
Tender Offers 135 O AN 09711 -6.342*+*
0.557 O.853 -0240+w
Share Takeovers 242 0.820 1 331 -0 .511 ***
0.687 1.094 -02265**
Stock4oStoek 166 0765 1.284 -0 .519
Acgosltions 0.618 1.012 -0242e**
Mergers 76 0.939 1 A32 -0493***
0.816. 1.336 -0 .159**+
Total 377 0751 1.202 -0450***
0.621 0.987 -0.236**"
                                _13 Biddere V/P Target9 V/P HiddaS V/P                      T." V/P
11.940 
11796
1.10-) 
0731
1.197 
0.731
0.911 
0.731
1.047 
0.734
0.834 
0.746
1.187 
0x49
1.063 
0769
1.459 
056
1.061 
0x00
0106 
0049
 -0 .080 
-0 -115**-
0.134 
-0 .109^
-0 .548 
-0 .178^
-0 .014 
-0.062*
Table 4: CARs of Bidders and Targets 
The table shows the mean CARS and the corresponding t-statistics in the second row. It also shows the number 
of sample where the CARs are positive or the difference of CARS is positive, which I use for a sign test. 
and "show the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Bidder Target
Types of M&A N
CAR
(fslats )
# of
Posidve
CARS
CAR
(t Oats )
# of
Positive
CARS
Target,, CAR
-Bidders CAR
# of
Positive
CAR
Differences
Tender Offers 135 0.20% 68 1212%*** 1 I R*r* 11.92%*** 108***
(0.39) (12.46) (10.55)
Share Takeovers 242 1.71 %** 144xx 5 95%*** 1748*# 420%**x 165xxx
(4.46) (7.31) (5.03)
Smck4oStock 166 1.03%** R9 687%*** 12058 5 63%*** 118*w
Aequsitions (2.48) (6.53) (6.53)
Mergers 76 3.20%*** 55*** 54*** 0.71 % 4788
(4.04) (3.35) (0.53)
Total 377 1.17%*** 212** R. 15%*** 292*** 6.97%*** 273**'
(3.80) (12.63) (9.99)
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Table 5: Comparison among Different Types of M&A 
This table summarizes the difference of the mean of B/P, V/P and CARs between different types of M&A. Panel A 
compares tender offers with share takeovers (stock-to-stock acquisitions plus mergers). Panel B compares 
mergers and stock-to-stock acquisitions within the sub-sample of share takeovers- ' and ' show the 
significance of difference at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Ridder Target
   Panel A 
Tender Offer va. 
Share Takeover
Tender 
Offer
 Share 
Takeover
Difference 1alsts
Tender 
Offer
 Share 
Take
Difference tstale
R/P 0.629
VIP 0940
DAM
1.107
0.191
-0 .167
3370 *°*
-0 .689
RIP 0970
VIP 0834
1.331
1187
0360
-e35 a.
-3456 see
-2265 **
CAR 0002 0017 -0015 -2 .365 ** CAR 0.121 0.1159 0062 4724 see
Bidder Target
  Panel B 
 Merger 
Stock-le-Sleek
Merger
Stock-to-
 Stnck
Difference r-stab Merger
Stuck-to-
Stock
Difference rear,
B/P 0939
VIP 0911
0765
1.197
(1174
-028fi
2.270 .*
-0 .755
B/P
VIP
432
1459
1 284
1 063
0 148
0,396
1 015
1.647 *
CAR 0032 spin 0022 2 635 ** CAR 0.039 0068 -0029 -1 fi70 *
Table 6: Choice Among Different Types of M&A 
This table shows the results of the logic regression analyses for the choice among different types of M&A. Panel 
A shows the results from logit regressions where the dependent variable is 1 for share takeovers and 0 for cash 
tender offers, and Panel B shows the results from logit regressions where the dependent variable is 1 for 
mergers and 0 for stock-to-stock acquisitions. and' show the significance of difference at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Lei it Analysis (Share Takeovers=l Cash Tender) Offer =0)
Coefficient  slats. Coefficient z-stars. Coefficient a-slaw.
Inleeep1 
Bidder's BIT 
Bidder's V/P 
Target's B/P 
Target's VIP 
Target's Mkt Cap.) 
Bidder's Idiot Cap. 
Toehold
-1 .651 
0.197 
0.007 
0498 
0.389
2.273
2.423
-3 .591 
0.696 
0.173 
2.722
1579
2.564 **
5014
-1,601
0.541 
(1.414
2.399
2418
-3 .644
2.956 
1.655
2.677
5.019
-0.945 
0.721 
0.016
1.798
2160
-2.901 
2.588 
0.462
*4*
2.292 **
4 776
N 
McFaden-R2
375 
0.122
 375 
0.121
 375 
0.088
Panel B: L it Analysis (Met era =1 Stock-to-Stock Ac usitions = o)
Coefficient z-stats. Coefficient z-stats. Coefficient z-stats.
Intercept 
Bidders B/P 
Bidders V/P 
Targets B/P 
Target's VIP 
Target's Mice ap. / 
Bidder's Mkt Cap. 
Toehold
-1 .298 
-0.227 
-0.170 
0.218 
0.235
4.596
-2 .709
-2 .318 ** 
-0 .706 
-0.673 
1.296 
1.407
4.286
-3 .443
-1 .469
0.163 
0.197
4.383
-2 .731
-2 .8I5
1.094 
1.231
4.196
-3.411
-0 .785 
-0.004 
-0 .155
4.204
-2 .878
-1 .618 
-0 .014 
-0 .567
3.998
-3 .699
N 
Pseudo-H2
242 
0.112
 242 
0.112
 242 
00R7
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Table 7: Multivariate Analyses of Bidding Premium and CARs 
This table shows the results for the TSLS regressions ofbidding premium, buyers CARs and target's CARS. The 
CARs are 3-day (day -1-+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on a fixed return model. and * show 
the significance of difference at 1 %, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Bidding Premium Bayer's CARs Target's CARs
Intercept 
Bidder's B/P 
Bidder's V/P 
Target's B/P 
Target's V/P 
Target's Mist Cap. / 
Bidders Mkt Cap. 
Toehold 
Share Takeover 
Dummy 
N 
Adj-R 2
Coefficient
0.123 
-0.104 
0.000 
0.066 
0.001 
-0 .097 
-0 .175 
0.038
 375 
0.138
/-state 
 3.120 *** 
-4 .271 "** 
 0.064 
 4.387 *** 
 0.088 
-2 .813 *** 
-2.815 *** 
 0367
Coefficient 
   -0 .019 
   0.002 
   0.001 
   0.004 
   0.003 
   0.038 
  -0.011 
   0.024
 375 
0.108
t-stats 
-1 .745 
 0.324 
 0.968 
 1.047 
 1.174 
 3.990 
-0 .662 
 0.82R
Coefficient 
   0.122 
   -0.027 
   0.000 
   0.053 
   0.008 
   -0.008 
   0.061 
   -0 .169
 375 
0.109
1 -etats 
 5.411 
-1.959 
 0.049 
 6.188 
 1.420 
-0.389 
 1.710 
-2 .831
*#*
*
    In case of the manuscripts written by doctoral students, they undergo review by 
members of the Steering Committee or full-time faculty members of the School of 
Commerce. Such members must be appointed by the Dean of Graduate School of 
Commerce.
Editorial Board of WB&ES
118
